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Abstract—Browser extensions are third party programs, tightly
integrated to browsers, where they execute with elevated priv-
ileges in order to provide users with additional functionalities.
Unlike web applications, extensions are not subject to the Same
Origin Policy (SOP) and therefore can read and write user data
on any web application. They also have access to sensitive user
information including browsing history, bookmarks, credentials
(cookies) and list of installed extensions. They have access to a
permanent storage in which they can store data as long as they
are installed in the user’s browser. They can trigger the download
of arbitrary files and save them on the user’s device.
For security reasons, browser extensions and web applications
are executed in separate contexts. Nonetheless, in all major
browsers, extensions and web applications can interact by ex-
changing messages. Through these communication channels, a
web application can exploit extension privileged capabilities and
thereby access and exfiltrate sensitive user information.
In this work, we analyzed the communication interfaces
exposed to web applications by Chrome, Firefox and Opera
browser extensions. As a result, we identified many extensions
that web applications can exploit to access privileged capabilities.
Through extensions’ APIS, web applications can bypass SOP
and access user data on any other web application, access
user credentials (cookies), browsing history, bookmarks, list of
installed extensions, extensions storage, and download and save
arbitrary files in the user’s device.
Our results demonstrate that the communications between
browser extensions and web applications pose serious security
and privacy threats to browsers, web applications and more
importantly to users. We discuss countermeasures and proposals,
and believe that our study and in particular the tool we used to
detect and exploit these threats, can be used as part of extensions
review process by browser vendors to help them identify and fix
the aforementioned problems in extensions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Browser extensions or addons are third party programs, that
can extend the functionality of browsers and improve users’
browsing experience. In this work, we focus on the WebExten-
sions API, a cross-browser extensions system compatible with
major browsers including including Chrome, Firefox, Opera
and Microsoft Edge [1], [2], [3], [4]. Tightly integrated to
browsers, extensions have access to elevated browser APIs
and features. For instance, they can make HTTP requests to
get data from any web application server, including those
where users are logged into, such as their mailing, banking,
social network applications, etc. As a comparison, web ap-
plications are bound by the Same Origin Policy (SOP) [5]
and cannot access other web applications data, unless they
both implement mechanisms such as Cross-Origin Resource
Sharing (CORS) [6].
Due to their privileged position in browsers, it is well under-
stood that extensions pose serious security and privacy threats
to user data [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. Therefore, in
order to limit extensions capabilities, a mandatory permission
system requires that extensions explicitly declare the set of
APIs they effectively need to access. Nonetheless studies have
shown that extensions still require many permissions [14],
[15], [16]. Extensions also go through a review process from
browser vendors. But again studies have unveiled many mali-
cious extensions circumventing the review process to exfiltrate
sensitive user data [15], [17], [18]
Besides, a benign (non-malicious) extension can be buggy,
allowing adversaries to exploit its vulnerabilities in order
to get access to user sensitive data. One type of adversary
that can exploit such vulnerabilities in extensions is the web
attacker [9], [10], [13]. Indeed for security reasons, exten-
sions and web applications execute in different and isolated
contexts. Nonetheless, extensions have access to the DOM of
webpages. Extensions and webpages can also set up commu-
nication channels to exchange data with one another using the
postMessage API [19] for instance. Bandhakavi et al. [9]
and Carlini et al. [10] found that a few extensions manipulate
data extracted from webpages without sanitization, leading to
privileged escalations, because such data can be influenced by
a web attacker. Calzavara et al. [13] found that message
passing APIs can be abused for privilege escalation, and
formally characterized the privileges that be exploited by a
web attacker.
Similarly to those studies, our threat model considers the
web application as the attacker. Specifically, we seek to study
at large scale, the security and privacy implications of message
passing APIs [13] among extensions in the wild, whether there
are extensions that can be exploited by web applications to
access sensitive user information. For instance, an extension
can set up an interface (register a listener) to receive from web
applications, messages consisting of the URL of a resource
(data) hosted by another web application. The extension then
makes a request to fetch the data (since it can do so with any
web application as it is not subject to the SOP) and returns
the response to the web application that sent the URL. Hence,
these communications channels are a way for a deliberately
or accidentally vulnerable extension to indirectly give a web
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application access to browser features and APIs that the web
application is not directly allowed to access.
We built a static analyzer and applied it to the message
passing interfaces exposed by Google Chrome, Firefox and
Opera extensions to web applications. When the tool found
that a privileged extension capability could potentially be
exploited by web applications, the extension was flagged
suspicious. By manually reviewing the code of suspicious
extensions, we found that 197 of them (mostly on Chrome) can
be exploited by web applications (attackers) to access elevated
browser features and APIs and sensitive user information. The
extensions we have found have vulnerabilities that can be ex-
ploited by web applications to (i) break the privilege separation
between extensions and web applications and execute arbitrary
code in extensions context, (ii) bypass the Same Origin Policy
and access user data on other applications, (iii) read user
cookies and use them to mount session hijacking attacks [20],
(iv) access data such as user browsing history, bookmarks,
list of installed extensions that besides violating user privacy
can be used for tracking purposes [21], [22], [23], [24], (v)
store and retrieve data from extensions persistent storage for
tracking purposes and (vi) trigger the download of malicious
software on the user device which execution can damage user
data.
In summary, this paper shows the security and privacy
threats associated with the interactions between browser ex-
tensions and web applications and makes the following con-
tributions:
• We built a static analysis tool and analyzed extensions
message passing interfaces at large-scale: 66,401, 9,391
and 2,523 extensions on Chrome, Firefox and Opera
respectively. About 4.97%, 5.14% and 8.48% of Chrome,
Firefox and Opera extensions respectively were flagged
as suspicious.
• We identified 197 extensions that pose various security
and privacy threats to browsers, web applications, and
users. They can be exploited by web applications to
bypass the SOP, read user cookies, browsing history,
bookmarks, list of installed extensions, store and retrieve
data from the extension storage, or download malicious
files and store them on the user device.
We provide online a web page for navigating through the
different results of this work, including the tool and videos
demonstrating how we exploited the capabilities of some of
the extensions.
In the beginning of October 2018, we reported our findings
to the vendors who positively acknowledged the issues. For
instance, Firefox has already removed all the reported exten-
sions, and Opera all but 2. We are still discussing with Opera
on how to fix the 2 extensions. With Chrome, we are also
discussing with them on the actions to take. That notwithstand-
ing, we argue that browser vendors need to review extensions
more rigorously, in particular take into consideration the use of
message passing interfaces in extensions. We think that tools
such our static analyzer can help in identifying and fixing the
security and privacy threats we have identified in this paper.
We also discuss a few proposals on the current design of the
message passing interfaces so as to mitigate the attacks that
web applications can mount against extensions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Browser extensions capabilities
Standard web technologies (HTML, CSS and JavaScript) are
used to develop extensions for major web browsers including
Chrome, Opera, Firefox, and Microsoft Edge. Interestingly,
their specific extensions APIs, [1], [3], [2], [4] are compatible
with each other to some extent, making it easy to migrate
extensions written for a specific browser to other browsers with
just a few changes. This work focuses on these extensions,
referred to as WebExtensions.
Extensions security considerations Extensions are third
party software, that users install to alter their browsers behav-
ior and improve their browsing experience. Tightly integrated
to browsers, extensions have access to privileged browser
features, making them interesting targets for attackers. Hence,
to limit the harm that attackers could cause if they take
control of an extension, the APIs that extensions effectively
have access to are only those for which they have explicitly
requested the related permission in their manifest.json
file. Listing 1 shows an example of manifest file and the
permissions (features and APIs) the extension will be
granted at runtime.
{
"permissions": [
"<all_urls>",
"storage",
"management",
"cookies"
"history",
"bookmarks",
"downloads",
]
}
Listing 1: Permissions declaration in a manifest file
These are only a subset of all the capabilities provided by
browsers to extensions. When installed, this extension will be
granted full access (read/write) to data on any web application,
thanks to its host permission <all_urls>. This implies
that if the user is logged into a web application (such as
mailing, banking, social networks), the extension also has
access to the user’s private data on that application. The
rest of the permissions read straightforwardly. The storage
permission allows the extension to store and retrieve data
in the browser as long as it is installed. The permissions
management, cookies, history, and bookmarks give
the extension access to the list of installed extensions, web
applications cookies, user browsing history and bookmarks
respectively. With the downloads permission, the extension
can download and save arbitrary files in the user device.
At runtime, those APIs (and any extension-specific API in
general) are all accessible via the chrome object in Chrome
and Opera browsers, and via browser object in Firefox and
Microsoft Edge. To ease the readability of this work, we often
omit the chrome and browser from extensions APIs names.
Architecture
Fig. 1: Browser extensions architecture - Communications
with web applications
Extensions can be divided in three main parts, as shown
in Figure 1. The background page is the main part of the
extension. It has full access to all the capabilities of the
extension. Users interact with the extension through UI pages
(i.e. UI elements, options and setting pages), in order to enable
or disable it, or customize its behavior. UI pages also have
access to the full capabilities of the extension. Content scripts
are injected by extensions to run along web applications.
Even though they are not granted access to all the extension
capabilities, they can directly use the host and storage
permissions to access user data on any web application or to
store and retrieve data from the extension storage. Content
scripts can also manipulate the DOM of webpages [25] and
inject content in them. On Chrome and Opera, each extension
is assigned a permanent unique identifier, which is the same
for all users of the extension. Firefox however generates a
random identifier for the extension, per user browser [26].
B. Interactions
Background and UI pages have direct access to each other’s
execution contexts [27], but content scripts execute in a
separate context. Web applications run in yet other separate
execution contexts. Nonetheless, content scripts have direct
access to web applications localStorage, DOM, and execution
context, where they can inject and execute arbitrary scripts.
Even though content scripts, background pages and web
applications run in separate execution contexts, they can
establish communication channels to exchange messages with
one another [28], [29] as shown in Figure 1. We describe
below the APIs for sending and receiving (listening for)
messages between the content scripts, background pages and
web applications.
Content scripts and background pages There are two
types of communication channels: one-time and long-lived
channels. One-time channels are opened to send a message and
are closed after the response is received. Long-lived channels,
connections or ports, are maintained open to exchange multiple
messages. A port can have a name in order to distinguish it
from other long-lived channels.
For one-time messages, content scripts use the
runtime.sendMessage API to send messages to
background pages. Similarly, background pages employ the
tabs.sendMessage API to send messages to content
scripts. For receiving messages, both components can invoke
the runtime.onMessage.addListener API.
Similarly, runtime.onConnect.addListener and
runtime.connect are used to establish long-term com-
munications between background pages and content scripts.
Web applications and content scripts Exchanges be-
tween web applications and content scripts are achieved with
the Cross-Origin Communications API [19]: postMessage
is used for sending messages, and onmessage or
addEventListener to receive messages. Below is a listing
which shows how messages are sent and received between web
applications and content scripts.
// Send and receive
postMessage("Hello Extension", "*");
addEventListener("message", function(event){
Received_response = event.data;
});
// Receive and Reply
addEventListener("message", function(event){
Received_message = event.data;
postMessage("Hello Web Application", "*")
});
In this example, the web application sends the message
Hello Extension to the content script, which receives and
writes it in the variable Received_message. Then it replies
with Hello Web application, which the web application re-
ceives and saves in the variable Received_response.
Web applications and background pages On Chrome
and Opera, web applications can also directly communicate
with extensions background pages. To do so, extensions
have to declare in their manifest.json file, using the
externally_connectable key, the list of web appli-
cations, where communication with the background page is
allowed. For security reasons, one cannot use wildcard (for
instance *) to allow communications between the background
pages and all web applications. Additionally, communications
can only be initiated by web applications.
The runtime.sendMessage and runtime.connect
APIs are exposed to web applications in Chrome and Opera,
and can be used to send one-time messages or establish long-
term connections with background pages. Conversely, the
APIs runtime.onMessageExternal.addListener
and runtime.onConnectExternal.addListener
can be used in the background page, to receive and reply
to messages sent by web applications. Below is an example
of how to send a message from a web application to the
background page of an extension which unique identifier is
ExtensionID.
// Send and Receive
chrome.runtime.sendMessage(ExtensionID, "Hello
Extension", function(response){
Received_response = response;
});
// Recieve and Reply
chrome.runtime.onMessageExternal.addListener(
function(message, sender, sendResponse){
Received_message = message;
sendResponse("Hello Web application");
})
The application sends Hello Extension to the background page
which replies with Hello Web application.
C. Threat models
An attacker is a script that is present in a web application
currently running in the user browser. The script either belongs
to the web application or to a third party. The goal of the
attacker is to interact with installed extensions, in order to
access user sensitive information. It relies on extensions whose
privileged capabilities can be exploited via an exchange of
messages with scripts in the web application. We consider the
following security and privacy threats posed by extensions.
1) Execute code: these are extensions that can be exploited
by the attacker to execute arbitrary codes in the exten-
sion context. Executing code in the background page
gives the attacker access to all the capabilities of the
extension. In content scripts, the attacker can bypass
SOP by making cross-origin AJAX requests, and use
the extension permanent storage for tracking purposes.
2) Bypass SOP: in this case, an attacker can exploit the
capability of the extension to make cross-origin requests
without being restricted by the Same Origin Policy.
3) Read Cookies: the attacker can read the user cookies
and use them to mount session hijacking attacks, access
user data and take actions on her behalf.
4) Trigger Downloads: the attacker exploits extensions
to trigger the download of arbitrary malicious files
(software) and saves them on the user’s device without
requiring any action from the user. If the user inadver-
tently runs such software, the attacker takes control of
her device and performs malicious actions.
5) Read browsing history, bookmarks and list of in-
stalled extensions: these information reveal the user
interests and habits and can be used by the attacker for
tracking purposes, or to serve targeted and personalized
advertisement.
6) Store data: the attacker can store and retrieve informa-
tion in the extension storage. This can be used for track-
ing purposes, even though users clear web applications
storages.
For the sake of simplicity, we often refer to the attacker as the
web application in which it runs.
III. METHODOLOGY
We built a static analyzer that detects suspicious commu-
nications enabled by extensions with web applications. To
identify extensions that are potentially concerned with the
security and privacy threats identified in the previous section,
we focus on 78,315 extensions from Chrome, Firefox and
Opera browsers. Then we manually reviewed the code of
the extensions to precisely validate the results of the static
analyzer, and more importantly to construct the signatures
of the messages that have to be exchanged with extensions
to successfully exploit their capabilities. Figure 2 shows the
analysis process.
Fig. 2: Methodology - static and manual analysis
A. Static analysis
The goal of the static analyzer is to report only extensions
that potentially pose a security and privacy threat, in order
to reduce false positives as much as possible, and reduce
the burden of the manual analysis. It has been fully writ-
ten in JavaScript, using various Node.js packages. We used
Esprima [30] and Recast [31], for parsing and manipulating
JavaScript abstract syntax trees (AST), and Jsdom [32] for
parsing HTML.
Unpack extensions and gather scripts We crawled ex-
tensions using SlimerJS Browser Automation tool [33]. In
the extension manifest.json file, background pages are
either declared by a set of scripts files, or an HTML file,
which further includes the scripts of the background page.
UI pages are built as HTML pages, and also indicated in
manifest.json file. The Jsdom HTML parser served
here to extract scripts embedded in background as well as
UI pages. Static content scripts are directly declared in the
manifest.json file. Background and UI pages can further
dynamically inject content scripts in web applications, by
calling the tabs.executeScript API. Those were also
extracted by analyzing the AST of background and UI pages
scripts, and analyzed as other content scripts.
Parse scripts and build AST Scripts were parsed with Es-
prima, resulting in an AST [34], which contains all JavaScript
constructs used in content scripts, background and UI pages
scripts. Almost everything in JavaScript is an object [35].
To ease manipulation of the AST, the following additional
actions were taken to build three indexed tables of assignments
to variables and object properties (assignments), function
definitions/expressions and object methods (functions),
and finally functions and object methods invocations (calls).
Basically, those are key/value pairs, in which the keys in
the tables corresponded to the names of variables, object
properties and functions. Each entry was then associated
with a list of all possible values it could resolve to. For
assignments, the values were all expressions assigned to a
variable or object. For function definitions and object methods,
the values were the parameters and body of the function.
Finally, for function calls, the values associated to their names
in the indexed table were their invocation arguments. The
static analyzer successfully handled functions defined using
the bind method, and functions invoked using the call or
apply methods.
Event handlers of page messages APIs For each mes-
sage listener (See Section II) in content scripts, background
and UI pages, we first looked up the indexed table of
function invocations (calls) to search whether the exten-
sion registered listeners for messages from the web applica-
tions (a call to addEventListener API for instance in
content scripts). In browser contexts, all JavaScript objects
are properties of a global object named window. Differ-
ent aliases, this, self, global, are sometimes used
to refer to the window object [36], [37]. JavaScript ob-
ject properties can be accessed using the dot and the array
or bracket notations [38]. For the sake of simplicity, we
considered the dot notation and the bracket notation when
the property name was a literal (a string). Considering the
global object names (window, top, self, this), and
JavaScript dot and bracket property accesses, we generated
the different ways an API can be invoked. For instance,
addEventListener can be called in 9 different ways
addEventListener, window.addEventListener,
window["addEventListener"] and others. In general,
we consider that an object could be accessed in 9 different
ways, its properties in 18 different ways, the properties of
its properties in 36 ways and so forth. When we found
an invocation to communications APIs in content scripts,
background and UI pages, we extracted their arguments and
resolved them as follows.
For addEventListener, the first argument should be
the literal message, and the second argument a function.
Otherwise, we use the indexed table of assignments and
functions to resolve them to the literal message and a
function respectively. Resolving an argument simply consist
in checking whether the indexed table has an entry which
key matches the argument name, and further checking whether
any of its associated values resolve to the type and value we
expect the argument to have. For addEventListener, we
expect the first argument to be a Literal and have the value
message. Its second argument is expected to be a function.
We follow the same process to extract all message handlers
(listeners) in content scripts, background and UI pages.
Sensitive APIs Calls The handlers (functions) of web
applications messages in extensions are parsed to extract all
their constructs. If the handlers further call other functions,
those functions are looked up using the indexed table, and
their bodies parsed to also extract their constructs. Finally,
the constructs are analyzed to decide whether the extension
potentially poses any of the security and privacy threats
considered in this work.
• An extension is flagged as potentially executing ar-
bitrary code sent from web applications if it invokes
functions like eval (in any part of the extension) or
tabs.executeScript (in background and UI pages).
• An extension is flagged as potentially allowing web appli-
cations to bypass SOP, if its constructs include APIs that
can be used to make AJAX calls. This includes the cre-
ation of new XMLHttpRequest objects, calls to fetch
API, or any AJAX specific API provided by popular
third party libraries such jQuery and AngularJS ($.get,
$.ajax, $.post, $http.get, $http.post).
• If the constructs include calls to storage API such as
storage.local.set, storage.local.get,
storage.sync.set, storage.sync.get, then
the extension is flagged as potentially storing/retrieving
data for web applications.
• An extension is considered as potentially leaking user
cookies, history, bookmarks, and list of extensions
to web applications if either of the following
invocations were found in their message handlers
constructs: cookies.getAll, history.search,
history.getVisits, bookmarks.getTree,
management.getAll, and related APIs.
• Finally, an extension is considered as probably allowing
web applications to download and save files in the user
computer (device) if their messages event handlers con-
structs include invocation to downloads.download.
It is worth mentioning the case of content scripts forwarding
messages to background pages. When this is the case, the
constructs of content scripts messages handlers in the back-
ground pages are also analyzed, looking for calls to any API
which potentially poses security and privacy threats. In fact,
content scripts only have access to the host and storage
capabilities. When they need access to more capabilities, they
can send messages to the background pages which may then
give them access to the related capability. Content scripts can
forward messages they receive from web applications, to the
background page. The latter handles the message and responds
to the content scripts which in turn respond to the application.
This is particularly true in Firefox which does not allow direct
communications between web applications and background
pages. Nonetheless, we have observed many content scripts
forwarding messages to background pages, even to access
APIs they can directly use from their own context.
B. Manual Analysis
Recall that for each suspicious extension, the tool reports
precisely (i) the component(s) (content scripts, background or
UI pages) and the file or set of files to analyse, (iii) the name
of the message passing interfaces registered (iv) the handlers
of the message passing interfaces and other functions that are
called from those handlers (v) and finally, the sensitive APIs
that are triggered in the handler and its called functions. So
the goal of the manual analysis was to confirm the suspicion
of the static analyzer, build and test the precise signatures
of messages that had to be sent by web applications to
exploit extensions capabilities. Following is how we typically
manually review an extension.
Unpack in Browser First, we download and unpack the
extension code directly in a browser, using the CRX Extension
Viewer [39]1. We locate the files to be analyzed, according to
the concerned component(s). In the particular case of content
scripts, the tool reports the precise index in the content scripts
array containing the file or set of files that has to be analyzed 2.
Identify Messages This step is concerned with building the
payloads or signature of messages that can be sent to the
extension to exploit is capabilities. In each file, we search
for the message passing interfaces, their handlers and the
functions they invoke. In those handlers and functions, we
look for the sensitive APIs that are triggered and more
importantly, the parts of the received messages that trigger
calls to the extensions sensitive APIs. To build the payloads,
we carefully inspect how objects received as parameters in
the message passing interfaces handlers (and related functions)
are manipulated, which properties of the objects are accessed,
the names of the properties, and their values. This gives us
the precise signature of the messages. Two situations arise
here. Either we found that the signature of the messages are
predefined by the extension, in which case they cannot be
influenced by the attacker (See Section V-H for more details),
and we stop the analysis and consider the extension as a false
positive. Otherwise, we continue the analysis by installing and
interacting with the extension by sending messages according
to the signature that we have found.
Install and Test – Download and Patch The final step
consists in mounting the exploits against the vulnerable ex-
tension with the payloads built in the previous step. Those
interactions are done from the Browser console [40], after we
navigate to the websites in which the extension injects its files.
Sometimes, those websites require users to be logged in. We
would create accounts and navigate to them. In rare cases, we
could not create accounts or the websites were not responding.
So we download the extension, and modify its permissions in
order to make it inject files in websites that are accessible
(i.e. http://localhost/), from were we mount the attack. During
the tests, we use the browser debugger, set breakpoints in the
extension codes in order to track the propagation of messages
and calls in the extension code.
Time taken to manually analyze extensions It is rather
difficult to precisely evaluate how much time it takes to
manually analyze an extension. Indeed, this work went through
3 phases. We did a first crawl of extensions in the middle of
November 2017 and run our static analyzer to test it. It took
around 2 months and half ( till the beginning of February 2018)
to come with a mature analyzer. But during that phase, we had
already discovered almost 87% of the extensions reported in
this paper. Then, from the beginning of February 2018 we
analyzed all the extensions again in around 4 weeks. Finally,
in mid of May 2018, we did a new crawl and analysis, and it
1CRX Extension Viewer [39] is an handy extension that can download and
nicely display in the browser the content of extensions, allowing to navigate
their files very conveniently
2Indeed, content scripts are declared as an array of a set of files, so the
tool reports the index of the files to analyse
took around 10 days to vet the extensions. Again, for most of
the extensions, we had already tested them, built the signatures
of the messages, so analyzing them again consisted only in
checking that they were still exploitable.
So overall, what we observed is that during the phase
we implemented and tested the static analyzer, manually
reviewing the code of a suspicious extension was long, because
the process was rather imprecise and not straightforward. Then
throughout that period of tests, we had acquired a lot of
expertise in the review process, which made it faster in the
end. For instance, we have started to recognize similar patterns
and codes in extensions (many extensions reuse similar code)
and therefore we knew when they had to be skipped or not an
extension. Currently, we think that for an expert, 15 mn would
be a sufficient average time to correctly review an extension for
the threats that we have reported. In practice, some extensions
will take longer to analyse while others will be analyzed in a
couple of minutes.
C. Limitations and Challenges
First note that we considered only scripts that are part
of the extension packages. For instance, background and
UI pages may reference external scripts. Those scripts were
not considered in our analysis. Nonetheless, we think that
extensions bundles are more likely to contain most of the APIs
that we consider in this work, as extensions developers are
recommended to avoid referencing remote scripts in extensions
codes.
Our static analysis tool suffers from many limitations. The
first one is the fact that we did not consider scopes [37], which
lead to unnecessary functions being analyzed. However, this is
not a problem ultimately because all the results were further
manually reviewed to remove false positives. It also suffers
from some false negatives, mainly because of the flexibility
of JavaScript that make it challenging to exhaustively address
all the ways message listeners can be invoked in extensions.
Manually analyzing complex, large and sometimes minified
and obfuscated JavaScript programs making use of callbacks
everywhere is not trivial for a single person. But we have taken
all the time that was necessary to correctly perform the study.
Finally, for a very few extensions, despite all our efforts at
the static and manual analysis levels, we could not draw any
conclusion about the potential threats they may pose.
IV. TOOL FOR ANALYZING COMMUNICATIONS APIS
This section demonstrates a case study of the tool. We have
released online a web version of the tool. It can be used to
analyzed extensions directly in a browser.
Result of the static analyzer Listing 2 shows the result
produced by the tool when applied to the eRail.in Chrome
extension [41].
{
"com_via_cs": {
"to_back": {
"back": {
"ajax": {
"$.get": "",
"$.post": "",
"$.ajax": "",
"XMLHttpRequest": ""
},
"cookies": {
"chrome.cookies.getAll": "",
"chrome.cookies.remove": "",
"cookies": ""
}
}
}
}
}
Listing 2: Result of analyzing the eRail.in extension
• com_via_cs implies that webpages can communicate
with the extension via the content scripts, by using the
postMessage API. This extension has only 1 content
script. When there are multiple content scripts, the tool
analyzes each of them independently and produces results
corresponding to each of them.
• to_back indicates that the messages sent by webpages
to the content script are forwarded to the extension
background page.
• The tool found that two sensitive APIs are
reached in the background page: AJAX requests
with calls to the jQuery AJAX APIs ($.get,
$.post, $.ajax) and access to cookies with
invocation to the chrome.cookies.getAll and
chrome.cookies.remove APIs.
The main goal of the tool is to raise awareness about
the fact that an attacker may potentially get access to the
extension’s privileged APIs. One can then further review the
code to validate or refute the results of the tool. For instance,
after manually vetting the code of the eRail.in extension, we
effectively confirm that any webpage can access all user cook-
ies and make AJAX request to any domain. See Section VI
for more details about examples of messages to be sent to
extensions to benefit from their privileged capabilities.
Releasing the tool In addition to the full static analyzer
used in this work, we have also prepared an online version for
analyzing the message passing APIs of extensions. The only
difference with the version used in this work is that it does not
handle dynamically injected content scripts. This was done for
simplicity reasons. That notwithstanding, in order to analyze
dynamic content scripts, one can simply declare them in the
extension manifest as static content scripts. Both versions of
the tool will be publicly released.
There is room for further improving the tool. For instance,
lessons can be learnt from the state-of-the-art on JavaScript
static analysis tools in order to improve the extraction of
messages passing listeners and tracking the escalation of
extensions sensitive APIs. The set of threats considered in
this work can also be extended further with state-of-the-art
extensions threats in the literature.
V. EMPIRICAL STUDY
We downloaded Chrome [42], Opera [43], and Firefox [44]
extensions by the end of November 2017. The extensions were
statically analyzed in the beginning of February 2018 — on a
cluster of 200 nodes mainly because of storage limitations on
our own devices. This was preceded by a long period of tests
during which we improved the static analyzer, and fixed the
list of security and privacy threats. In the middle of May 2018,
we did another crawl and analysis. The results presented here
are for this second dataset.
In this section, we first give an overview of the results, then
we discuss in more details each threat and the report extensions
where it was found.
A. Overview
Table I presents the number of extensions we collected and
analyzed. Chrome provides the largest share of extensions,
followed by Firefox and Opera. Recall that for Firefox, we
are considering only extensions built using the new WebExten-
sions API [45], and not those using the XPCOM/XUL API [2].
The static analysis tool reported 3,996 suspicious extensions
that we manually vetted. The results of the manual analysis
are also shown in Table I. As with the share of extensions,
Chrome had the largest share of extensions with threats. In a
total of 197 extensions, only 16 were found on Firefox, 10
on Opera, and the 171 others are Chrome extensions. Note
that some single extensions pose more than one threat at a
time. All the 197 extensions reported here effectively posed at
least one or more of the security and privacy threats described
in Section II. During the manual analysis, we also identified
the messages to be sent in order to exploit their capabilities.
The full list of the extensions and the threats that they pose are
given in Table IX in the Appendix, because of page limitations.
TABLE I: Data overview
Chrome Firefox Opera Total
Extensions analyzed 66,401 9,391 2,523 78,315
Suspicious extensions 3,303 483 210 3,996
Execute Code 15 2 2 19
Bypass SOP 48 9 6 63
Read Cookies 8 - - 8
Read History 40 - - 40
Read Bookmarks 37 1 - 38
Get Extensions Installed 33 - - 33
Store/Retrieve Data 85 2 3 90
Trigger Downloads 29 5 2 36
Total of unique extensions 171 16 10 197
Extensions installs and categories Figure 3 presents the
distribution of users impacted, or the number of installs per
extension at the time of writing this paper. Around 55% of
the extensions have less than 1000 users, while the remainder
45% have thousands of installs, showing that those threats
are present in rather popular extensions, hence affecting many
users. About 27% of extensions have less than 100 users and
another 27% have between 100 and 1000 users. We see this as
an opportunity for a tool such as ours to help improve exten-
sions security, as it can serve to detect potentially malicious
extensions while they are not yet very popular among users,
thereby limiting their impact on users.
Table II further presents the category of these extensions.
Note that the categorization of extensions is not done the same
way by Chrome, Firefox and Opera browsers. Some categories
exist only on specific browser, and not on others. Moreover, we
found similar (or the exact same) extensions being differently
classified depending on the browser. We tried to merge the
different categories whenever possible.
As one can observe, Productivity is the most popular
category among the reported extensions. It is also the most
popular category among all Chrome and Opera extensions
we have downloaded, and also the most popular category in
various datasets in recent studies [23], [22], [18]. This category
does not exist on Firefox.
We were surprised by the results that only 15 extensions
(7.61%) are classified as Developer Tools. Considering
the severity of the threats, we were expecting that most of
them would be extensions provided for developers to perform
some controlled experiments. Since our results represent only
a lower bound of the number of extensions potentially posing
these risks, it would not be surprising that even more exten-
sions also exhibit similar threats.
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Fig. 3: Distribution of the number of users per extension
TABLE II: Category of extensions
Category # Extensions
Productivity 81
Social & Communication 48
Fun 19
Accessibility 17
Developer Tools 15
Search Tools 6
Shopping 4
Blogging 2
Privacy & Security 2
Other 2
Appearance 1
Total 197
Extensions privilege only some web applications About
55 extensions (45, 7 and 3 on Chrome, Firefox and Opera
respectively) communicate with any web applications to give
them access to extensions privileged APIs. Interestingly, on
Chrome, 7 of them allow to execute arbitrary code in the
extension context, 15 of them are concerned with SOP bypass,
26 for storing data, 2 can be exploited by any web application
to read all user cookies and 5 to read the cookies of the current
web application.
The vast remainder of extensions (72.08%) can be exploited
only by specific web apps to benefit from their privileged
capabilities. For instance, reading user browsing history, book-
marks, and list of installed extensions, is enabled by extensions
only to specific applications such as fliptab.io, atavi.com,
mail.google.com. In particular, downloads are allowed by
many extensions (on Chrome and Opera) mostly from vk.com.
The fact that most extensions allow communications with
only some specific apps can also be explained by the fact that
most of those we found allow interactions between web apps
and the background pages directly. Let us recall that it is only
possible to allow communications between background pages
and specific web apps (and not all web apps).
Extensions allow to connect to arbitrary web appli-
cations If many extensions tend to privilege specific web
applications as shown previously, the exact opposite is ob-
served regarding the hosts extensions allow web applications
to connect to, in order to access user data. For example, 37
out of the 48 extensions that can be used to bypass SOP on
Chrome, give access to the user data on any other application.
On Firefox, it is 6 out of the 9 extensions which allow access
to any web application data.
These two observations (extensions mostly give access to
their privileged APIs only to some web applications, and allow
them to access any other web application data in the case
of SOP bypass) suggest that the access they give to their
capabilities is rather deliberate. Moreover, for the majority of
extensions, the messages to send to exploit the different APIs
in extensions are so trivial that they could have only been
deliberate (See Section VI).
Most privileged web applications As already mentioned,
most extensions allow specific apps to benefit from their priv-
ileged APIs. This is the case for instance of fliptab.io where
scripts can communicate with 31 very similar HD wallpaper
extensions on Chrome, that has hundreds to thousands of users.
The domain vk.com can interact with 19 extensions (17 on
Chrome and 2 on Opera), mostly to download files on the user
device. The domain atavi.com can get access to user’s history,
most visited websites (topsites) and bookmarks thanks to 6
extensions.
Extensions which pose more than one threat All the
extensions reported here pose at least 1 of the security and
privacy threats considered in this work. Nonetheless, some
extensions pose several threats.
The eRail.in [41] extension on Chrome gives access to all
user cookies and allows full SOP bypass from any web appli-
cation. Moreover, it has more than 400k users. Interestingly, a
version of the extension exists on Firefox, but it leaks cookies
and data of a limited set of web applications (all related to the
extension owner’s domain) to the the extension’s provider own
domains. Five extensions provided by Fabasoft (See Table VI
in the Appendix) leak the current tab cookies. As such, they
allow attackers to even access HTTPOnly cookies, and use
them to mount session hijacking attacks.
Ringostat dialer [46] is the only extension that executes
arbitrary code sent from app.ringostat.com directly in its
background page. All other extensions execute the arbitrary
attacker code in the context of the content scripts. Recall
that the background page has access to all the capabilities an
extension declares. Interestingly, it has the host, storage,
cookies, and tabs permissions, meaning that any script
present on app.ringostat.com can access user data on any other
domain, access the extension storage, cookies, open new tabs,
inject code directly in any tab, etc.
StartHQ [47] also allows to bypass SOP from starthq.
com, and leaks user browsing history. Similarly, SalesforceIQ
CRM [48] allows to bypass SOP and leaks installed extensions
to mail.google.com and salesforceiq.com.
Finally, user browsing history, bookmarks and installed ex-
tensions can be read by an attacker in atavi.com and *.fliptab.io
thanks to 6 and 31 extensions respectively (See the full list in
the Appendix). The latter also let fliptab.io stores and retrieves
data in the extension storage.
Cross-browser extensions It is worth mentioning that most
of the extensions we found on Opera and Firefox were also
present on Chrome. While the compatibility of extensions
APIs on major browsers [2], [1], [3], [4] let developers reach
more users, attackers also widen their attack surface because
they can impact more users thanks a single cross-browser
extension. For instance, we have noticed that megatest2016,
an extension provider, had 2 extensions on Chrome, and
a very similar one on Opera. At the time of writing this
paper, Chrome removed the 2 extensions (they were allowing
ok.ru and other applications to bypass SOP, but we do not
know if their removal were due to the SOP bypass) while
on Opera, it is still available as MegaTest - [49]. The 2
Photo Zoom for Facebook and Facebook Photo Zoom Firefox
add-ons have similar versions on Chrome, but these do not
allow SOP bypass. Similarly, the ModernDeck extension is
present both on Opera [50] and Chrome [51]). On Opera, it
allows to store/retrieve data, while on Chrome it does not. This
represent yet another problem of cross-browser extensions.
While users of the same extension suffer from security and
privacy threats on one browser, on the other browser where the
extension is removed or fixed, users do not. Browser vendors,
and more importantly users would gain from security and
privacy perspectives, if browser vendors share their reviews
of extensions with one another, in order to help take similar
actions like removing extensions, or updating them to remove
threats they pose.
B. Execute Code
Extensions execute in browsers with elevated privileges.
From an attacker’s perspective, being able to execute arbitrary
code in an extension context also gives the attacker access to
the extension capabilities. We found 15 extensions on Chrome,
2 on Firefox and 2 on Opera that can be exploited by web apps
to execute code in their privileged context. Only one extension
on Chrome Ringostat dialer [46] executes in its background
page, code that it receives from app.ringostat.com. Then it
gives access to user data on any application, user cookies,
allows code injection in in any tab the user opens, the use
of the extension storage, etc. All other extensions execute
the attacker’s code in the contexts of the content scripts.
Even though content scripts have limited access to extensions
capabilities, they are not subject to SOP, can store/retrieve
data, and more importantly, they have access to the full DOM
on the web applications pages in which they are injected.
The extension iwassa, present on Opera [52] and
Chrome [53] allows any app to open any URL in a new
tab, and execute any code (content script) in it. If the code
in the context of the content script can already access any
application data, one can further inject specific content in
the DOM of the new tabs opened, to exfiltrate for instance
any token/secret present in the application DOM. In fact, in
addition to cookies, many sensitive applications use tokens to
further perform additional checks about the origins of requests
before letting users perform sensitive actions on their data.
Another interesting example is that of the LinkClicker
extension also present on Opera [54] and Chrome [55]. It
allows any application to send a code which will be further
injected in any new tab the user opens during the current
browsing session. One can use it to track the user while she is
browsing, gather any credentials that she is providing to log
into any application, and exfiltrate those to the attacker.
In many of these cases, the problem is due to the fact that
the extension does not correctly sanitize the codes received
from web applications, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary
codes. A good example is that of the GureTV: To watch
television extension on Firefox [56]. It did well to sanitize
content sent from web applications, but not content sent from
iframes embedded in the applications. Hence, one can create
an iframe, and send an arbitrary code which will be executed
in the context of the content scripts.
Many of the other extensions work similarly, and allow
(at least) to access arbitrary user data on any application,
and/or store and retrieve data (when they have the appropriate
permissions).
C. Bypass SOP
Extensions are not subject to the SOP, and therefore have
access to user data on any web application for which they have
declared the host permission. Through message exchanges
with extensions, 48, 9 and 6 of extensions on Chrome, Firefox
and Opera respectively, allow web applications to bypass
SOP by accessing user data on any other web application.
As for other threats, the trend is rather to allow only some
web applications to bypass SOP, even though 15 of such
Chrome extensions allow any application to access any other
application data. Hence, the majority of arbitrary SOP bypass
can be exploited by specific web applications, including: ok.ru,
mail.google.com, logincat.com, etc. Interestingly, when SOP
bypass is possible, in most of the cases the data of all domains
can be accessed. On Chrome for instance, it is 37 out of the
48 extensions that allow access to any application data. Even
when the SOP bypass is partial, it is enabled to rather sensitive
domains. For instance, 5 extensions out of 11 allow SOP
bypass to users’ Google accounts: salesmate.io, appspot.com
and aliexpress.com can access users Gmail account. One
extension [57] allows access to the linkedin.com data of more
than 400k users from Gmail, and blog.renren.com can access
github.com [58].
D. Cookies
We found 8 Chrome extensions that can be exploited by
web applications to read user cookies: 2 of them allow any
web application to read all user cookies [41], [59], 1 only
allow app.ringostat.com [46] to read all user cookies,
and the other 5 of them allow an attacker script to read the
cookies of the tab in which it executes. The number of users
affected is very important (more than 415k for eRail.in [41],
9.6k for Telerik Test Studio Chrome Playback 2014.1 [59]
and 78 for Ringostat dialer [46]. Cookies can be used to
hijack users browsing sessions, access their data and take
actions on their behalf. It is worth mentioning that the three
extensions that can be exploited to read all user cookies, have
probably been poorly programmed. It is more likely that the
ability to read cookies was meant to be used from specific
web applications, but unfortunately the extensions were poorly
programmed, allowing other web applications to also get
access to user cookies. In particular, the Ringostat dialer [46]
extension did not expose any means to get user cookies. But
it allows to execute any code sent from app.ringostat.com in
the extension background page context (using eval function),
giving the application access to all the capabilities of the
extension. Among those, the cookies, storage and arbitrary
host permissions, and the ability to open tabs, inject and
execute arbitrary code in them, etc.
We found that the web application https://erail.in/ is ef-
fectively reading all user cookies when the eRail.in [41]
Chrome extension is installed. This means that the extension
is intentionally given access to user cookies to https://erail.in.
However, it is not clear whether the cookies of interest were
only those of https://erail.in or any cookie or if only cookies
of https://erail.in/ were meant to be leaked. Unfortunately,
any web app can access all user cookies stored by any web
application, and use them to hijack user sessions. Interestingly,
the extension has a version on Firefox, where the cookies
which are leaked are only those of domains related to erail.in
and are leaked only to erail.in and eair.in.
The case of the extension Telerik Test Studio Chrome
Playback 2014.1 [59] is particularly interesting, as one has
to setup complex interactions, involving the extension content
scripts and background page, as well as the application and its
server. In particular, the interactions are triggered from the web
application, but the cookies are sent to the server of the ap-
plication instead of being returned directly to the application.
Following the same mechanism, one can clear cookies, delete
user browsing history, etc. A similar extension is also available
on Firefox progress-test-studio-extension. Unfortunately, we
could not analyze it as it was not downloading.
Finally, 5 Fabasoft extensions (See more details in Table VI
in the Appendix) allow the attacker to read the current tab
cookies of any web application. Even though a web application
protects its cookies with the HTTPOnly flag [60], an attacker
script running in the web application bypasses this protection
by obtaining the cookies via the extension. It can further use
them to mount session hijacking attacks against the user.
E. Downloads
Exploiting extensions to trigger the download of arbitrary
files is enabled mainly from specific applications including
vk.com (See Table IV in Appendix) and ok.ru. Only 2 ex-
tensions on Chrome and 3 on Firefox allow downloads from
arbitrary web apps. The main purpose of the related extensions
were to allow the download of music and videos. Sometimes,
they would even suffix the downloaded file name by .mp3
or .mp4. Nonetheless, we have been able to exploit these
extensions in order to trigger the download of arbitrary files
and save them in the user’s device. An attacker can also do
so to download malicious software, which when inadvertently
executed by the user, may allow the attacker to take control
of their computer and perform malicious actions.
It is worth mentioning that none of these extensions required
user action to trigger the downloads. One of them, multiDown-
loader [61] even overwrites a file if it is already present on
the user’s device.
It is also worth mentioning the case of the Chrome repl.it
download extension [62]. It is a helper extension for the https:
//repl.it application used for creating and running programs
in different languages online. The extension allows to save
the code being created. Even though the extension prompts
the user to confirm the file name (default is program.), the
content of the file can be fully arbitrary. As such, an attacker
can trick the user in saving the code being edited, while a
completely different content is saved.
F. History, Bookmarks, and List of Installed Extensions
Two providers distinguish themselves with regards to ex-
tensions that can be exploited to get access to user brows-
ing history, bookmarks and list of extensions. On Chrome,
fliptab.io [63] provides 31 very similar HD wallpapers
extensions (See the full list in Appendix), and allows fliptab.io
to get all browsing history, bookmarks and the list of user
installed extensions. Each of these extensions has between a
hundred and 25k users.
Furthermore, six extensions provided by atavi.com also pro-
vide the same privileges to pages at atavi.com and atavi.test.
One of them, Atavi - bookmark manager [64] has more than
96k users.
Additionally, Browser History [65] leaks user browsing
history to www.americaninternetmatrix.com/history. Finally,
StartHQ [47] leaks browsing history to https://starthq.com.
Other extensions that give access to the list of extensions
include Boomerang for Gmail [66] (with more than 1.5 million
users) to mail.google.com and SalesforceIQ CRM [48], to
mail.google.com and salesforceiq.com.
G. Store/Retrieve Data
About 85 extensions can be exploited by various web
applications to store and retrieve data. On Chrome, 26 of
these extensions give any application access to their storage.
Others give specific apps access to their storage. For instance,
fliptab.io can store data in the user’s browser thanks to
its 31 extensions. The domain netflix.com is also able to
store data thanks to 3 extensions, and mail.google.com
to do so thanks to 2 extensions. The extensions ISOGG Y-
Tree AddOn [67] and PhyloTreeMT AddOn [68] are from
the same provider, even though the web applications they
allow to persist data are respectively isogg.org and
phylotree.org.
Recall that extensions storage is persistent and not affected
by the clearing of browsing data (web application cookies,
storages, ...). As such, they represent a resilient storage which
can be used to bypass user privacy preferences and uniquely
identify them even though they have cleared their cookies.
Interestingly, some extensions propose to sync data they store
on all the devices the user is logged into. For instance, if a user
logs into multiple devices with the same extension installed,
then syncing storages lets an application tracks her accross all
her devices.
H. Other Threats
For SOP bypass, we have reported here the cases where
web applications can access arbitrary data on other web
applications. Nonetheless, we found many extensions allowing
to access some predefined data of other web applications.
This also represents a SOP bypass (since web applications
cannot access such data with their normal privileges). Finally,
we found some Opera and Chrome extensions (like the 31
HD wallpaper extensions by fliptab.io), and some not reported
here) which allow web applications to clear user browsing data
including cookies (or even set/get cookies of some specific
domains), history, bookmarks, cache, stored passwords, or
enable/disable/uninstall extensions. We do not include such
cases in this paper because of page limitations.
VI. CASE STUDY
In this section, we show how an attacker can exploit
the capabilities of an extension by sending the appropriate
message. One can also find online a few videos demonstrating
the exploits on some of concerned extensions, on the Chrome
browser. In order to gain access to privileged browser features
via an extension, an attacker first needs to ensure that the
extension is installed and enabled. Many recent studies dis-
cussed extensions discovery, using for instance their unique
identifiers and web accessible resources [21], [23] or DOM
specific changes they introduce in web pages [22]. This is
not really needed here. Knowing the structure of messages
extensions respond to, is sufficient. If the extension is present,
it will surely reply. To benefit from extensions capabilities, it
is sufficient that the attacker is present in a web application
with which the extension can interact.
A. Example of messages to send to extensions
We refer to Section II which presents the message passing
APIs between webpages and the different components of an
extension. Because of page limitations, we cannot provide for
all extensions, the messages that can be sent from web pages
to exploit extensions capabilities. We illustrate at least each
threat by an extension.
Execute code in content scripts context: Listing 3
present the structure of messages that can be sent from any
webpage to the jianlibao [69] Chrome extension to execute
arbitrary code in the context of its content scripts. Replace
CODE with real JavaScript code, then serialize the message
using JSON.stringify before sending it. The extension
has the storage and host permissions meaning that any
page can bypass SOP and get access to user data on any
domain, store data in the extension storage and later retrieve
it for tracking purposes. Moreover, the code is injected in the
active tab the user is interacting with. As the user may switch
tabs at any time, one can send the code regularly (say every
second) in order to ensure that it is injected in all the web
applications the user is interacting with. Since content scripts
have access to the DOM of webpages, the injected code also
has full access to the active tab DOM, giving it the ability
to undertake any action: recording user name and password,
credit card numbers, emails, etc.
{
type: "getResumeInfo",
downloadObj: {
resumeWhereabouts: 5
},
context: {
contentScript: CODE,
jsMethod: "console.log"
}
}
Listing 3: Executing arbitrary code in the context of the
content scripts of the current tab the user navigates to, thanks
to the jianlibao Chrome extension.
Extensions such as iwassa [53], [52] or LinkClicker [55],
[54], present on Chrome and Opera, even allow to send a URL
and a code. They will open the URL in a new tab, and execute
the code in the context of the content scripts injected by the
extension in the new tab. Listing 4 presents the case of the
iwassa extension. Replace URL with the URL of the page to
open in a new tab, and CODE with the real code to be executed
in the context of the new tab content scripts.
{
from: "logininfo",
val: [URL, CODE, "LoginAPI"]
}
Listing 4: Executing code in the context of a choosen tab
thanks to the iwassa extension present on Chrome and Opera.
URL is the URL of the page to open in a new tab, and CODE
the code to be executed.
The extension also has the host permission, allowing to make
AJAX requests to any domain.
Execute code in background page context: Background
pages are the most privileged contexts, as they have access
to all the capabilities of an extension. Listing 5 shows the
message to send to the Ringostat dialer [46] Chrome extension
to execute arbitrary code in the context of its background
page. Interestingly, this extension has the host, storage,
cookies and tabs permission, giving an attacker the ability
to bypass SOP, store data in the extension storage, manage
user cookies and tabs (open new tabs, close some, etc.).
Messages are to be sent from webpages which URLs match
*://app.ringostat.com/*.
{
message: "execCommand",
data : {
command: "eval",
params: CODE
}
}
Listing 5: Message to send to Ringostat dialer background
page to execute arbitrary code. Replace CODE with the real
code to be executed.
Bypass SOP: Here we take the example of the Buxenger
extension, available both on Chrome and Firefox. Listing 6
shows the structure of messages to be sent to the extension in
order to make AJAX requests to any domain (SOP bypass).
The case shown here, is for making HTTP GET requests. But
the extension also allows to make AJAX requests using HTTP
POST, DELETE, PATCH methods.
{
message: "ajax-get",
url: URL,
callbackId: ID
}
Listing 6: Make arbitrary AJAX requests thanks to the
Buxenger extension present on Chrome and Firefox. Replace
URL with the URL of the data to access, and ID with any
value.
Retrieve cookies: Listing 7 shows the case of the
eRail.in Chrome extension which allows any webpage to
retrieve the list of user cookies.
{
Action: "GETCOOKIE"
}
Listing 7: Message to send to erail.in extension in order
retrieve all user cookies
This includes any cookies, such as the user authentication
cookies set after she has logged into web applications. One
can further use the cookies to mount session hijacking attacks.
The extension also allows to make arbitrary AJAX requests,
by sending messages as shown in Listing 8
{
Action: "GET_BLOB",
URL: URL
}
Listing 8: Making AJAX requests thanks to the eRail.in
Chrome extension
Downloads files: Listing 9 shows the signature of mes-
sages to send from any webpage, to the HTTP Comman-
der [70] Chrome extension in order to trigger the download
of any file. Replace FILE URL with the URL of the file to
download, and FILE NAME with the name under which the
file will be saved on the user device. Multiple files can be
sent in the message. They will all be downloaded one after
the other.
{
type: "HTCOMNET_DOWNLOAD",
files: [{
url: FILE_URL,
path: FILE_NAME
}]
}
Listing 9: Download files on the user device, thanks to the
HTTP Commander extension.
Store data in extension storage: Listing 10 shows
messages to send in order to store and retrieve data in
the VisualSP Training for Office 365 [71] Chrome extension
storage. Replace DATA TO STORE with the data to be stored
in the extension storage. Later on, send the second message
to retrieve data. The data will be sent to iframes in the page.
To collect the data previously stored in the extension storage,
before sending the message, one can simply add an iframe
to the webpage, then send the message, collect the previously
stored data from the iframe, and send it back to the parent
page.
// Store data
{
owner: "VisualSP",
command: "SetUserId",
data: DATA_TO_STORE
}
// Retrieve data.
{
owner: "VisualSP",
command: "GetUserId"
}
Listing 10: Store and retrieve data in VisualSP Training for
Office 365 Chrome extension storage
History, bookmarks, extensions list: We show here the
case of the Space Galaxy HD Wallpapers [72]. It is one of
the 31 HD Wallpapers from fliptab.io (See Table III in
the appendix) that lets pages matching *.fliptab.io, to manage
user history, bookmarks, extensions list and storage. Listing 11
shows the different messages that has to be sent to get the
related information.
// Message for retrieving user browsing history
{
type: "history",
act: "get_all"
}
// Message for retrieving bookmarks
{
type: "bookmarks",
act: "get_all"
}
// Message for retrieving the list of extensions
{
type: "extensions",
act: "get_all"
}
Listing 11: The Space Galaxy HD Wallpapers Chrome
extension allows to get user browsing history, bookmarks and
extension list
B. Forcing the attack
In order for an attacker to gain access to an extension’s
APIs, he must have a script loaded in a web application that
is allowed to interact with the extension. Moreover, in most
cases, the application has to be running in the user browser
in order for communications to be possible. Figure 4 shows
a simple scenario in which A.com is an application currently
running in a user browser. This application provides content
A.com/content (a script) for another application B.com which
can communicate with an extension to get access to some
privileged APIs. However, B.com is not currently running
in the user browser. A.com can force the attack to happen,
by opening B.com (upon a user interaction with the A.com).
Once B.com runs, the script that it embeds from A.com gets
executed and can communicate with the extension to get access
to its privileged APIs — for instance to access user data on
any other application — and exfiltrate this to A.com. With the
prevalence of some third party scripts providers among web
applications [73], this scenario can be easily implemented by
attackers to gain from extensions capabilities.
Fig. 4: A.com forces an attack by opening B.com thereby
allowing A.com/content to load, execute and interact with
extensions in order to exfiltrate user data to A.com.
Combining multiple extensions Another scenario where
access to any extension capabilities can be indirectly gained
is when some extensions make it possible to open new tabs and
inject and execute arbitrary codes in them. We have recorded a
video showing the use of the LinkClicker extension [55] which
allows to open a new tab and execute code in it, and the Space
Galaxy HD Wallpapers extension [72] which allows only
fliptab.io to get/delete user browsing history, bookmarks
and extensions list. From any application (the localhost in
our example), we opened www.flipatab.io, and injected
a code in its context. The code retrieved the list of extensions,
bookmarks and user history. This information could be further
sent to a server chosen by the attacker. One can even use the
LinkClicker extension to send the retrieved information back
to the attacker by opening a new tab of the attacker application
(localhost in our case).
VII. DISCUSSION
Here we discuss countermeasures and proposals to mitigate
the threats introduced by extensions via message passing.
A. Disclosure to vendors
We have disclosed the list of extensions to Chrome, Firefox
and Opera. All vendors acknowledged the issues. Firefox has
removed all the reported extensions. Opera has also removed
all the extensions but 2 which can be exploited to trigger
downloads. The reason given by Opera is that the downloads
can only be triggered from specific websites. However, we
made them observe that those websites include third party
scripts that can also trigger arbitrary downloads. So discussion
still continues with Opera on the 2 remaining extensions, in
particular to ensure that users are aware of the downloads.
Chrome also acknowledged the problem in the reported exten-
sions. We are still discussing with them on potential actions
to take: either remove or fix the extensions.
B. Proposals
The discussions with browser vendors confirmed our argu-
ments that their current extensions review process is weak.
In fact, none of them has considered the fact that extensions
put user data at risk via vulnerabilities in the use of mes-
sage passing APIs. Moreover, we are worried that malicious
extensions developers that would be aware of the ability to
exfiltrate user data via message passing, would deliberately
introduce such vulnerabilities in their extensions. There are
various ways an extension could exploit its own vulnerabilities
without being blocked by browser vendors. For example,
the extension developer can operate a website. Then when
the user opens her browser and navigates to her favorite
web applications, the extension injects its own website as an
iframe and exfiltrate user data from that iframe. For browser
vendors, a quick fix of the threats discussed in this work
is to consider message passing interfaces as a medium for
introducing vulnerabilities in extensions, thereby putting users
data at risk. New extensions must be reviewed accordingly,
in order to fix such threats. To help in this process, browser
vendors may mandate that extensions explicitly declare the list
of web applications they intent to interact with by message
passing via the extensions content scripts, very similarly to
what is done with the externally_connectable key
used in extensions manifest.json files to declare the list
of web applications the extension background pages intent to
directly interact with (See Section II-B).
The best solution to mitigate this threat would have been
to ban the interactions between webpages and extensions,
but this would impact the many extensions making use of
these communication interfaces. Nonetheless, the needs and
implementations of the message passing interfaces are ques-
tionable. In fact, extensions can already read/write web appli-
cations DOM. For extensions that absolutely need to exchange
messages with webpages, browser vendors may review the
current extensions system and allow messages only from code
injected by extensions in the context of webpages. In fact,
extensions can inject code directly in the context of webpages.
Currently, such code runs with the same privileges as codes
loaded by webpages themselves. We envision an architecture
in which the browser tracks the origin of messages received
in extensions. And if they are not sent by code injected by
extensions, the messages is not delivered to the extension.
There are surely ways an attacker can circumvent this solution,
but such attacker is exactly the one already discussed by
Carlini et al. [10] and Bandhakavi et al. [9].
VIII. RELATED WORK
The security and privacy implications of browser extensions
have been extensively studied. Barth et al. [8] analyzed the
Firefox XPCOM architecture and proposed a new extensions
architecture that has since been adopted by Google Chrome
and evolved into the Chrome Extensions API compatible
with the cross-browser WebExtensions API. Before them,
many authors had also shown the dangers of misusing the
powerful APIs provided to Firefox XPCOM extensions and
propose tools for discovering vulnerabilities and securing
extensions [7], [9], [11], [12]. Among other things, the permis-
sions system in extensions was meant to reduce extensions ca-
pabilities, and hence reduce the harms that attackers can cause
if they compromise an extension. However a good number of
studies have shown that many extensions still request too many
permissions [14], [15], [16]. Guha et al. [14] proposed IBEX
a cross-browser extensions platform, supporting fine-grained
access control policies with tools for verifying the compliance
with the security policies. The work of Carlini et al. [10] on
vulnerable extensions has led to the ban of inline and HTTP
scripts and eval-like functions in extensions background pages.
Different dynamic analysis systems have been proposed for
discovering malicious extension such as Hulk [15] and Ex-
Ray [17] based on the concept of honey pages. Starov and
Nickiforakis [18] found many extensions leaking sensitive user
information such as browsing history, search queries, form data
and extensions list. Recently, many studies have demonstrated
different techniques for discovering browser extensions and
shown that they can be used to fingerprint browsers [21], [22],
[23], [24]. Other threats considered in this paper have been
discussed outside of browser extensions [74], [75], [76], [77],
[20], [78], [20], [5], [60].
Calzavara et al. [13] were the first to show that message
passing interfaces could lead to privilege escalation and ex-
ploits by web applications. We discussed directly with the
authors of this work. Their goal was to formalize the privileges
that an opponent can escalate thanks to the message passing
APIs between web applications and extensions content scripts.
In the extensions system they considered, content scripts had
no privileges and direct interactions with background pages
were not possible. They had proposed a prototype implemen-
tation of their system named CHEN for developers to evaluate
the robustness of an extension against privilege escalation and
help them refactor their codes, but the tool is no more available
and it did not take into account long-term communications
(ports)
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first large-
scale study on the security and privacy implications of the
communications between browser extensions and web applica-
tions, allowing the latter to benefit from extensions privileged
capabilities. We built a static analyzer for analyzing extensions
and identified a good number of them, demonstrating how
these extensions can be exploited by web applications to
benefit from extensions privileged capabilities and thereby
access sensitive user information.
IX. CONCLUSION
Browser extensions are third party code in browsers with
access to privileged APIs not accessible to web applications.
Nevertheless, web applications and browser extensions can in-
teract with one another by exchanging messages. In this paper,
we built a static analyzer and applied it to Chrome, Firefox and
Opera extensions. We identified a good number of extensions
that can be exploited by web applications to benefit from
their privileged capabilities. In particular, some vulnerable
extensions allow web applications to bypass the Same Origin
Policy security mechanism and access user data on any web
application. Extensions also leaked user credentials (cookies),
browsing history, bookmarks, list of installed extensions, to
web applications or allowed them to download any file on
the user device, or store data in the extension storage for
tracking purposes. We showed how trivially, attackers can
exploit those threats, and discussed proposals as to mitigate
them. In particular we argued for a review process taking
into consideration the threats we have discussed, with the
help of tools such as our static analyzer, or changes in the
extensions system itself to ban or limit messages only to
extension injected scripts.
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TABLE III: Extensions with the same code base which gives
*.fliptab.io access to browsing history (get/delete), bookmarks
(get), extensions (get/enable/disable/uninstall) and storage
bddmmehmgpjhhmbbmngdjhlednmkbken, cajmbfbhhfelhgolhldhhodkclpakcfe
cepmfckfppjpbkjgnpokojedlngflnca, clkodoejadlbjaopcjoijihebbgipjff
dekpebffaadijeaogggfhjemdbjgbcao, dkpndikhfepllbpaafgcelembimabofo
eeiedbnahjonkmimigblgchlefcklhok, efdddbobcofamdjmekphjlhgmcnhobbp
ehmhopjniedignnkdeijmpmodhcppgif, eilbnnflfpkhhfmhmlhflhecceajpkcj
fieoemdbopiialnojhifcndkenhjkbmm, fkpmpnljocdllgmplhnmjhjmmilbnofj
gfgchcclfmppnfoakdlhgdhnolbpiedf, glfbbjdfmmlanpikdedpjoeimlijjcjj
hmbedbiicehadpbhbipafffieolpjolh, hocncjdhccalpmblkpagbmjebkfkibbm
iamlligjelallbdddajmbojjjhadkmcf, jcffnpjkbahanenhcnhhdfopkjlpflfm
jokpapkhjeahjbkemfjfhjgcogmbcpoi, kkejopfphkmldfpdmcljfoinfcljijjf
klfeojnepdoehgddffbcjiamcjjahmgj, lbfidebeingoondbmpeapjoeeoloanak
lgphbplfjpemcghfcoajehcmikflcbbd, lmbcpiodajlbgmjbiajgcjdalgbofcbn
loggojfoonblkkhkjpijapeheoogagki, lpkfidfkgflpbakdnhpojiejlpdanknh
mgmodhbknbfmpjmilankiffnjbelcipo, mibaeahdcconphmdndbeipegldkkbcjh
odpiaedkmdpcheddbkilnkelhhocoenn, pfdaccgdljiifplhfnjcacapfedngonb
afddmpnodjaifgjibafjcbfaplnoipei
TABLE IV: Extensions with the same code base for trig-
gering downloads from vk.com, *.vimeo.com, *.coub.com,
*.kinopoisk.ru
nfhipbkhabgmkhahoaagkcgppcjikjgl idenapkfefkbknhbmfgeaclpcpbhcnbe
fnnlocjimhjpmgfjhjamdkjhemfhkhjo lmlnplkfbiihcpkghkkmfefjdaccmbcc
kbiocjbkoohjjkkeaafiemjeidgalllh dccmnjciogmmahaogjgkocongokmieog
ekfkljjojhnnhfedepfnbhhfjklagngk hhfgpbjpilbbaomjmdpnfchbpipehiif
pgajmafmbajahclonccaoaoleghhnpam ipeeopcjpgcbgnfogjlickeilmkbonen
jfpmehlefcchhhmlmennihbbihaolabk kcollknpphnodcjdkcmgpjmlbaenabao
backekeabechifnekobfachchocbmjag mfpbgndgoogfplejodpbhnfmaibnalkf
ojhheobonaamlhlcdngacakdcigpeokl mienmjdbnnpaigifneeiifdbjkdgelha
amaobfendgcolppeioeageanmillkmkc
TABLE V: Extensions with the same code base which leaks
topsites, history and/or bookmarks to *.atavi.com, *.atavi.test
iglbnbabjdfaobglhonmnlkdbommiebd, knflcnelciofoghldagpknelepafjeif
lamnafpjcnoclihgpefhdbefcmjikhaj, jffjjdoccjiflmckicphblggbppfgklk
ofmacdiceehcibkfednmgpkhgfhpacgi, jpchabeoojaflbaajmjhfcfiknckabpo
TABLE VI: Extensions with the same code base, provided by
Fabasoft, which give access to the current tab cookies
ajlbdflhaaflcepndpkdgejimggjcpnm, ngbcdblbfdpjgpmgfagkfofcjbnggfgn
pdhjoolhbkmlgjfedckdhiknnoabbnkk, hiejidhjgjpelfgldfhmnaoahnephhfg
icjlkccflchmagmkfidekficomdnlcig
TABLE VII: Extensions which give access to their storage to
any application
eljhpoopiapggnlfcilpbihgbgbpnkgd, akhamklknibionleflabebgeikdookmp
hebabhddakflgmlhgefakkfkciijliie, ilgdjidfijkaengnhpeoneiagigajhco
ohdihpdgfenligmhnmldmiabdhflokkh, abenhehmjmoifipfpjeaejpbeeihnokp
ackpndpapmikcoklmcbigfgkiemohddk, ceogcehidijhepckebfifkpfogkajdkg
cgijoonmpaboophnagdckdcekmpfokel, dhcfokhhmhenbfmeflifppiedabfggkj
dhcmolikocplmafolinkncghmahimooh, eamjolanjdmgochipodfokkfjaeifhon
efhbachoakbcmbcmfffdgphbpcbldjac, fecipnolpdcmoidbjbnakpjgfikbnaik
gnnagpehbmfalanfjadamobejlldgedo, ijdfpccaiklfhpnamolipbjjijilmhli
khjhfgcimhcnaimdbgjbnbhcojkoceoc, niceocbendibobemckcagggppphheomc
okcfiidnmioajibmhhjpiomgejajiafa, pjjceionkajpednnegoanjjdlhbgkkpc
pjojmkmdealampgchopkfbejihpimjia,
TABLE VIII: Extensions which give access to their storage to
specific applications
lpkhcobfjeidpkllbeagkkmmjgbmpfch mail.google.com
eggdmhdpffgikgakkfojgiledkekfdce mail.google.com
jmllflbhbembffempimjdbgnaodpoihh mail.google.com
jmlnhlclbpfcbkaoaegfigepaffoankc *.google.com,
gaoiiiehelhpkmpkolndijhiogfholcc netflix.com
ghldlmcbffbcnoofadgcapodmpiimflj netflix.com
jpgadigdffhcjldfkanacncocacekkie netflix.com/watch/
peiajekggpiihnhphljoikpjeaahkdcn beam.pro
bnfboihohdckgijdkplinpflifbbfmhm plug.dj
aclhfmpoahihmhhacaekgcbjaeojnifa wordix.io,
hcdfoeppbchkbbpplllggbjkkfokifej *.vk.com/feed/
hddnlanhlmifafibmlabomkkkobcmchj thankscoin.org
lhjajgnfmiliphkioedlmbfcdkhdhnkc *.service-now.com
bmdlalnebjigindhobniianfmhakfelf robertsspaceindustries.com,
dadggmdmhmfkpglkfpkjdmlendbkehoh openvideo.droppages.com
pbpfgdgddpnbjcbpofmdanfbbigocklj tweetdeck-enhancer
ilpkhojfiejdbkgcjbmllngjebdoehim *.phylotree.org
cfnjeahambijfdljfacldifapdcklhnj isogg.org
cjkbjhfhpbmnphgbppkbcidpmmbhaifa *.player.me
ddiaadobgihkgefcaajmkjgmnjakiamn auth.digitalkeyway.com
dienbdhbgkpddlgaceopelifcjpmkeha *.gestionderesidencias.es
dnpdkejhfeeipmklhlkdjaoakbkjkkjn datalane.io
gmjdaaahidcimfaipifeoekglllgdllb chat.stackexchange.com
kfodnoaejimmmphonklghkimhnhhgbce overlayBI.com
TABLE IX: Chrome, Firefox and Opera extensions which give web applications access to privileged APIs
Extension unique identifier or name Web applications to
send messages from
Target web applica-
tions to access
Permissions (accessible privileged API)
Chrome Browser
fimckmjeammfdcpldmcigeojkkmeeian * * eval, host, storage, downloads
fidaihkgnbcbkkdaoebdionfjenegede * * eval, host, storage
hnkmipajjgbclkombnmigfnpekddlhlh * * eval, host, storage
fajjnmbcianlnhmngmabhgkmgdindlha * * eval, host, storage
efajnkcfjjkcodbhkhaigkffdleomnag * * eval, host
hoobpdoclliidciecjifpikpnopjpmkh * * eval, host
kjfjdocojijlledbaanbhpcnkoimghal * * eval, host
pfofjhnkanlacmgfgjohncmgemffkldl app.ringostat.com * eval, host, cookies, storage
gooecknlakggnppmhfpopneedjconjjp lionlock.com, * eval, host, storage
bdiogkcdmlehdjfandmfaibbkkaicppk *.delfa.com.br * eval, host, storage
pgbjjemkcflenaakhiehfdmcdnlnlpbl www.seejay.cloud * eval, host, storage
hdanmfijddamndfaabibmcafmnhhmebi *.hirogete.com, * eval, host
hpmeebiiihmjelpjmmemlihhcacflflc *.valleyge.com * eval, host
oejnkhmeilmiplpmenkegjaibnjbappo search.lilo.org, * eval, host
jkoegdibpkleifbkojmplebjhfllkckn search.uselilo.org, * eval, host
aopfgjfeiimeioiajeknfidlljpoebgc * * host, cookies
hlagecmhpppmpfdifmigdglnhcpnohib * * host
kpgdinlfgnkbfkmffilkgmeahphehegk * * host
bjjpnhdlhpfdebcbhdlmecafnokpjpce * * host
bmiedopcajpcehbbfglefijfmmndcaoa * * host
jegnjmcegcpodciadcoeneecmkiccfgi * * host
jnhibbjmekoijdjaopflcjbjieamifhh * * host
jpkfmllgncphdgojhkbcjidgeabaible * * host
ilcpdgfepihaomggobhmfiimflngbcoh starthq.com, * host, history
jpcebpeheognnbogfkpllmmdnimjffdb mail.google.com, * host, management
cnkgdfnjmgamkcpjdljdncfjcegpgcdg mail.google.com, * host, management
cfddhmlokgokhcmepddjooekhmgmgfld *.ok.ru * host, downloads
efhgmgomhamkkmjbgmcpgjnabcfpnaek *.ok.ru * host, downloads
djhfcchmdelggndcpkgbanfhnpbbijdb *.ok.ru * host, downloads
fhlkioimlijffnblckmdikkadobdmlgn *.apistop.com * host
angncidddapgcmohkdmhidfleomhmfgi logincat.com, * host
lndhlcaobijohmgoikmgpgbhepkbhpkl oneom.tk * host
olpheomfiimdonpboopcailehdagfhaa .g3user.com, * host
idkghekmllmjgnmbohakcddgcclanlca ln.io * host
mhdhcccejcjfanablmohbpdbepdkokkj *.gvt.com.br, * host
plfffminkgohddbooidppccppgelajfp mp.weixin.qq.com, * host
cboekbiaoabkhgjdclenjpipclabkdga *.apiary.io, * host
ekeefjfdbaakgbfbagacmckiedkmakem *.salesmate.io, mail.google.com, host
lbjbbkhljiimahdeknpckaoiinopofhl *.appspot.com mail.google.com, host
ijmbknjhacbaeeoamjajoolgjgdbpkko *.aliexpress.com, *.google.com, host
hihakjfhbmlmjdnnhegiciffjplmdhin mail.google.com linkedin.com, host
cfbodcmobhpfbjhbennacnanbmpbcfkd *.aliexpress.com, appfreaker.com host
ommfijfafanajffiijecdlfjlbgpmgpl *.treesnetwork.com, docs.google.com, host
okgfglgogpkomipfflpajohdkaflndoh ouramazinghome.com www.google.com host
iiabjaofopjooifoclbpdmffjlgbplod blog.renren.com *.github.com host
mcdjehgaflnlmilhefigdkldfdnembhk *.spotsetter.com *.amazonaws.com host
lfekjajdgncmkajdpiadkkhhpblngnlc sub.watch, zooqle.com, host
gkfpnohhmkonpkkpdbebccbgnajfgpjp squares.io/fetch, www.nytimes.com host
pkkbbimilpjmghfhhppamgigileopnkc * * cookies
5 Fabasoft extensions (See Table VI) * current tab cookies
emiplbkkiabideffmpogkbbogkmofgph * - downloads
17 extensions (See Table IV) vk.com, - downloads
eadbjnlpeabhbllkljhifinhfelhimha ok.ru - downloads
ngegklmoecgejlbkiieccocmpmpmfhim *.tribecube.com - downloads
iogibhaacmieogkdgebfbjgoofdlcmgb *.shutterstock.com - downloads
ooeealgadmhdnhebkhhbbcmckehpomcj animevost.org - downloads
dnohbnpecjinmdpeikpnmheeepnapfci vtop.vit.ac.in - downloads
pgmcojeijjhacgkkjaakdafmloncpema repl.it - downloads
hacopcfnbokiahlppemnlneooamldola hypem.com - downloads
bpkphnbpiagbpinglgejckickdgaghjo amer...matrix.com - history
fheihcbdclkdoeadmjfggiamjgkippli .my-lucky-star.net - topSites
TABLE IX: Chrome, Firefox and Opera extensions which give web applications access to privileged APIs
Extension unique identifier or name Web applications to
send messages from
Target web applica-
tions to access
Permissions (accessible privileged API)
Chrome Browser
llelondjpcjljnjihdflhpclcpbiaiba *.msn.com - topSites
6 Atavi Extensions (See Table V) atavi.com, - history, bookmarks, topSites
31 HD Wallpapers (See Table III) fliptab.io - history, bookmarks, management,
storage
pnbfclligibfgdknphcodpbcejnkhffp * - bookmarks
eihbcgffjehfcgafjljohecmadcefoji app.launch.menu - bookmarks
empgohlokhdhhchkenknobacofijiffg app.launch.menu - bookmarks
aefmgkhgcmdljpfijlohmbhkhflmbmfi openoox.com - bookmarks
dhjhphjhpcelebeagllljbfpipdfkhgi .azurewebsites.net - bookmarks
jeabbgpkliknjiacfkfglknajloappkh yeahap.com, - bookmarks
22 Extensions (See Table VII) * - storage
24 Extensions (See Table VIII) mail.google.com, ... - storage
Firefox Browser
guretv-ver-tv * * eval, host, storage
buxenger * * eval, host
bitbucket-server * * host
logincataddon logincat.com, * host
facebook-photo-zoom-easy www.facebook.com * host
facebook-photo-zoom www.facebook.com * host
markanabak-eklentisi *.markanabak.com, *.wipo.int, host
skimdaddy * skimdaddy.com host
the-trees-network *.treesnetwork.com, docs.google.com, host
assina-me * - downloads
liber-capital * - downloads
video-downloader-1 * - downloads
openvost animevost.org - downloads
youtube-video-download-convert *.youtube.com - downloads
openvideo droppages.com - storage
vgis *.vonage.com - storage
Opera Browser
bmjcngclkmgpfbjcmnbidognkoocpllm * * eval, host, storage
jnmcfakfglphcmgokeeoihifcenjjcgg * * eval, host
pmpnemphhmmpkcafgpdjanghiaadfbef *.ok.ru * host
mpaghnpkgmnikepcgjddhckcedapomkp *.ok.ru, *.vk.com, * host
bcabkcaakkjfdlodkolfagbdejhhkigp *.lazyrobin.ru * host
bidjmocompdljmeglljcoecikgogfjbb sub.watch, zooqle.com, host
aghgmcnoiflhcnfjkckofmjbeinjkena vk.com, - downloads
mhjbdafcpnoapkglmldoofhhbpnogehk vk.com, - downloads
hajlecmoacenahambneialopbpleihjn * - storage
lkdpdiepahdagdknbbjgnadholcdgfib tweetdeck-enhancer - storage
